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REITMAN V. MULKEY
California's Proposition 14 And The "State Action" Concept
Reitman v. Mulkey1
Prior to 1964 the California legislature passed a series of open
housing laws designed to prohibit discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing by certain private sellers and landlords.2 In the 1964 general
election the voters of California, by an overwhelming vote, approved
Proposition 14 as an initiative amendment to the California Consti-
tution. Proposition 14, which became Article 1, Section 26 of the
California Constitution,8 repealed pro tanto the previously enacted open
housing legislation and by its terms barred action by any agency of
the state government to deny, limit or abridge the right of any person
to discriminate in the sale, lease, or rental of his residential real estate.
Mulkey, a Negro, and his wife were refused a lease on an available
apartment solely on the basis of their race. Mulkey's suit to enjoin
the discrimination was based on the open housing laws; the suit was
defended on the theory that the laws had been repealed by Article 1,
Section 26. The trial court, rejecting the plaintiff's contention that
the amendment was unconstitutional, granted summary judgment to
the defendant. The Supreme Court of California reversed and held
that the new constitutional section amounted to state action within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment 4 of the federal constitution and
therefore denied the plaintiffs equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the same amendment." The United States Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the California Supreme Court.
1. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
2. CAL. Cxv. CoDE §§ 51-53, 707 (West 1954); CAL. HEALTH AND SAF. CODE
§ 35700-35741 (West 1967).
3. CAL. CONSr. art. 1, § 26 states:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to
sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent
such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
"Person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations and other legal en-
tities and their agents or representatives but does not include the State or any
subdivision thereof with respect to the sale, lease or rental of property owned by it.
"Real property" consists of any interest in real property of any kind or quality,
present or future, irrespective of how obtained or financed, which is used, designed,
constructed, zoned or otherwise devoted to or limited for residential purposes
whether as a single family dwelling or as a dwelling for two or more persons or
families living together or independently of each other.
This Article shall not apply to the obtaining of property by eminent domain
pursuant to Article 1, Sections 14 and 143/ of this Constitution, nor to the renting
or providing of any accommodations for lodging purpose by a hotel, motel or
other similar public place engaged in furnishing lodging to transient guests.
If any part or provision of this Article, or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Article, including the
application of such part or provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not
be affected thereby and shall continue in force and effect. To this end the pro-
visions of this Article are severable.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "... No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
5. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966)
Comments on Mulkey v. Reitman, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rtv. 1 (1966), articles by Alfred
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Four justices dissented and Justice Douglas wrote a separate
opinion concurring in the affirmance. Justice White, writing for the
remaining four justices, stated his holding as follows:
This Court has never attempted the "impossible task" of formu-
lating an infallible test for determining whether the State "in
any of its manifestations" has become significantly involved in
private discriminations. "Only by sifting the facts and weighing
the circumstances" on a case-to-case basis can a "nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its
true significance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority....
Here the California court, armed as it was with the knowledge
of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and potential
impact of § 26, and familiar with the milieu in which that pro-
vision would operate, has determined that the provision would
involve the State in private racial discrimination to an unconstitu-
tional degree. We accept this holding of the California court.6
Finding support in prior Supreme Court cases, the California court
had found that § 26 "encouraged" and "authorized" private discrimi-
nation and made the state "at least a partner in the instant act of
discrimination."7 The Court did not question that the people of Cali-
fornia, acting by constitutional amendment, could have merely re-
pealed existing open housing legislation. However, the amendment
went further as the Court viewed its effect:
The right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate
on racial grounds, was now embodied in the State's basic charter,
immune from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any
level of the state government. Those practicing racial discrimina-
tions need no longer rely solely on their personal choice. They
could now invoke express constitutional authority, free from
censure or interference of any kind from official sources."
Justice White went on to note that discrimination as to residential
real property was purportedly authorized regardless of any interest of
the state in such property or its financing, so long as the property
was not owned by the state.
As will be discussed more fully later, it is difficult to determine if
Justice White viewed the problem as whether the state action was
"significant" 9 or whether the action was discriminatory. A review of
the prior cases may shed some light on the meaning of the decision.
Although cited only by Justice Douglas, the case of Shelley v.
Kraemer'° is generally considered to represent a basic shift in the
Avins, Jerre S. Williams, Harold W. Horowitz and Kenneth L. Karst, and Arthur
Selwyn Miller.
6. 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967).
7. Id. at 375.
8. Id. at 377.
9. See notes 27-32 infra and accompanying text.
10. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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general attitude on what activity will be deemed to constitute state
action prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. In Shelley the Court
ruled that specific enforcement by a state court of racially restrictive
covenants, which by private agreement sought to zone neighborhoods
as white only, was significant state action and, therefore, prohibited by
the equal protection clause. In Barrows v. Jackson," it was held that
a suit for damages based on a racially restrictive covenant cannot be
entertained by a state court. The state action found in Shelley and
Barrows was much more incidental than that in previous cases in that
the state courts were merely the means by which private parties seeking
to discriminate sought to effectuate that discrimination and were not
a force motivating private citizens to discriminate. 2
Justice White, however, sought to rely on two pre-Shelley cases
as supporting by analogy the invalidation of the California amend-
ment. Nixon v. Condon's involved an attempt by the state to divorce
itself from the process of voting in primary elections so that the execu-
tive committee of a political party could exclude Negroes from voting
for that party's candidates. The state was said to be abandoning a
traditional state function to enable those beyond the reach of the four-
teenth amendment to discriminate.' 4 As phrased by Justice White, this
abdication "was said to insinuate the State into the self-regulatory,
decisirn-making scheme of the voluntary association."' I  The statute
involved in McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.'" was
construed as authorizing carriers to provide service to white persons
without providing similar service for Negroes. 17 The question was
governed by Plessy v. Ferguson,8 which had upheld the "separate,
11. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
12. Though Shelley is i.. no way dispositive of the issues in Reitman, it is
important to note the effect that Shelley had on the somewhat settled theories of
state action which had been derived, in the main, from the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883), which held that congressional legislation designed to enforce the equal
protection clause by prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations could only
be directed at action by the state. The Court said: "It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject
matter of the amendment" Id. at 11. In a few cases, the Court acted against sham
procedures to evade the original concept of state action, see note 13 infra and accom-
panying text, and developed the concept of state authorization of, in addition to the
original idea of state requirement of, discrimination as fitting within the prohibited
area of state action. But since Shelley involved neither authorization nor require-
ment, and since there was no restriction placed on the Shelley holding, the logical
extension of Shelley would be involved when the state acted to aid a private dis-
criminator by the exercise of its coercive power. A situation was thus created in
which the concept of state action could be considerably expanded, and the need for
determining the limits of state action arose anew.
13. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
14. "They [the executive council of the political party] are acting in matters of
high public interest, matters intimately connected with the capacity of government to
exercise its functions unbrokenly and smoothly." Id. at 88. "Delegates of the State's
power have discharged their official functions in such a way as to discriminate in-
vidiously between white citizens and black." Id. at 89.
15. 387 U.S. at 379.
16. 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
17. The statute in McCabe, Rv. LAWS ORLA. (1910) § 860 et seq., provided
that the railroads had to provide "separate, but equal" coaches but did not have to
provide equal facilities for dining and sleeping and could not serve both races in the
same dining or sleeping car.
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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but equal" doctrine. Although denying relief because the complaint
was defective, the Court indicated that the statute constituted uncon-
stitutional state action. Jusice White stated this case in support of the
rule that merely authorizing, rather than compelling, discrimination
by a permissive state statute is contrary to the fourteenth amendment.
Justice White indicated that the California court had cited the
case of Anderson v. Martin,9 although he did not discuss the case.
In Anderson, Louisiana had a law which required the placing of a
candidate's race beside his name on the ballot. The Court ruled that
such a law places "the power of the State behind a racial classification
that induces racial prejudice at the polls."2  In a state such as
Louisiana, where the psychological environment renders the citizens
particularly susceptible to racial prejudice, the mandatory placing of
race on the ballot was an obvious and overt attempt by the state to
cause its citizens to discriminate in voting.
Justice White also discussed three sit-in cases in which the peti-
tioners were convicted under state trespass laws for failure to leave
restaurants and lunch counters which were required to segregate by
some coercive power of the state."' These sit-in cases stand for the
proposition that, where a state has a requirement of discrimination,
the state may not enforce even privately motivated discrimination by
the use of its coercive power; the use of its power in such a context is
prohibited state action.
The case of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority2 best
represents the difficulty the Court has had in resolving state action cases
since the Shelley decision. The Parking Authority leased part of one
of its garages to a restaurant which proceeded to practice discrimina-
tion; the Authority took no part whatever in operating the restaurant,
yet the Court found state action because all the circumstances, especially
the physical placement of the restaurant and its entrances made it
appear that the state had placed its "power, property, and prestige"2 3
behind the discrimination. The facts of Burton do not indicate even
the slightest amount of "action" by anyone except the restaurant,
19. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
20. Id. at 402.
21. In Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964), a Florida Board of Health
regulation stated, "Separate facilities shall be provided for each sex and for each race
whether employed or served in the establishment [restaurant]." This regulation does
not specifically require segregation, but it is certainly susceptible to such an inter-
pretation. In Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963), a statement by the Mayor
of New Orleans, "I have today directed the superintendent of police that additional
sit-in demonstrations .. .will not be permitted ... regardless of the avowed purpose
or intent of the participants. . . . It is my determination that community interest, the
public safety, and the economic welfare of this city require that such demonstrations
cease and that henceforth they be prohibited by the police department," coupled with
similar statements by the Superintendent of Police were interpreted as requiring
restaurants to continue to discriminate. In Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244(1963), a city ordinance, CODIE op GRENVILLn, N.C. (1953 as amended 1958) §§ 31-38,
provided: "It should be unlawful for any person owning, managing or controlling any
hotel, restaurant, cafe, eating house, boarding-house or similar establishment to furnish
meals to white persons and colored persons in the same room, or at the same table,
or at the same counter; provided, however, that meals may be served to white persons
and colored persons in the same room where separate facilities are furnished .. .
22. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
23. Id. at 722.
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which, had it not been in a state building, could have discriminated
under the then existing law of Delaware and the United States.
Despite the lengths to which the Court went to claim otherwise, Burton
appears to 'be a case where state inaction, by failure of the state to
require in the lease that the restaurant serve all races, was labeled
prohibited state action because there appeared to be authority from
the state agency to discriminate; thus the state's prestige became inter-
twined with the acts of its lessee.
The Court in Burton announced that it would not attempt to state
a broad formula for state action but would examine all the circum-
stances in each case and then determine whether state action existed
on a case-by-case basis. 2
4
Justice White stated that all of the cases he cited were distin-
guishable from Reitman though he did not say in what way they
could be distinguished. Nixon, though the Court in that case spoke
in terms of authorization and delegation, involved state abdication of
a traditional state function denying Negroes a meaningful right to vote.
Such is clearly not the case in Reitman. Two of the sit-in cases,
Lombard v. Louisiana and Peterson v. Greenville,5 were cases in
which the states required discrimination. If the Court accepted in full
the California court's finding that § 26 authorized and encouraged dis-
crimination, McCabe and Robinson v. Florida,26 which are authoriza-
tion cases, are distinguishable only in that the states in those cases
sought by statutes and regulations to create a new area in which a
certain class of persons could discriminate rather than the state's mere
enunciation in Reitman that all people had a right to discriminate
where those people appeared to have such a right in any case in view
of the repeal of the open housing laws. If McCabe and Robinson are
distinguishable, as Justice White indicated, and not for the strained
reason given in the preceding sentence, Reitman in the Court's view
is not really an authorization case but an encouragement case. Ander-
son is also difficult to distinguish from Reitman because the state
there was really only facilitating what the voters could have done
on their own. However, the environment of that southern state in
1964 makes it clear that the state's facilitation in Anderson was far
greater than that resulting from § 26.
Arguably, Burton is distinguishable from Reitman. In Burton
there was clearly no authorization by the state nor was there any
affirmative encouragement except to the extent that the state failed to
take any step to end or prevent discriminatory practices by its lessee.
In Reitman, on the other hand, the state has affirmatively acted in
that an amendment to its constitution, providing that everyone has a
right to discriminate, has been added. This constitutional provision
arguably authorized and to some extent, at least, affirmatively en-
couraged private discrimination. It is thus possible that Burton repre-
24. Id. at 725.
25. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
26. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. Robinson is treated here as an
"authorization" case, even though treated by Justice White as a "requirement" case,
because of the ambiguity in the Florida regulation.
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sents the least significant state action with which the Court has been
confronted and that the Burton result demands the result actually
reached in Reitman.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Black, Clark, and Stewart, dis-
sented, arguing that the California amendment did not push the state
beyond a permissible neutral or inactive position. Before considering
this dissent, it will be helpful to review the opinions in a 1964 restau-
rant sit-in case, Bell v. Maryland."'
Although the result in Bell was a remand to the Maryland Court
of Appeals for consideration in light of new state public accommoda-
tions legislation, the opinions of Justices Douglas and Black may help
to explain their positions in Reitman. In Bell, Justice Douglas would
have reversed the trespass convictions of the defendants for refusing
to leave a restaurant upon request. Justice Douglas believed that the
convictions violated both the privileges and immunities clause and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Relying primarily
on Shelley v. Kraemer, he found state action because:
Maryland's action against these Negroes was as authoritative
as any case where the State in one way or another puts its full
force behind a policy. The policy here was segregation in places
of public accommodation; and Maryland enforced that policy with
her police, her prosecutors, and her courts.2"
He found that such discrimination was squarely within the intent
of the reconstruction amendments, stating:
Prior to those amendments [the thirteenth, fourteenth and
fifteenth] Negroes were segregated and disallowed the use of public
accommodations except and unless the owners chose to serve them.
To affirm these judgments would remit those Negroes to their old
status and allow the States to keep them there by the force of
their police and their judiciary.2"
On the other hand, Justice Black, joined by Justices Harlan and
White, would have affirmed the convictions. His answer to the state
action argument of Justice Douglas was:
There is no Maryland law, no municipal ordinance, and no
official proclamation or action of any kind that shows the slightest
state coercion of, or encouragement to, Hooper to bar Negroes
from his restaurant. Neither the State, the city, nor any of their
agencies has leased publicly owned property to Hooper. It is
true that the State and city regulate the restaurants - but not by
compelling restaurants to deny service to customers because of
their race. . . . Under such circumstances, to hold that a State
must be held to have participated in prejudicial conduct of its
licensees is too big a jump for us to take. Businesses owned by
27. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
28. Id. at 257.
29. Id. at 247.
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private persons do not become agencies of the State because they
are licensed; to hold that they do would be completely to negate
all our private ownership concepts and practices.8 0
The concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Reitman is in accord
with his opinion in Bell. First he noted that the segregation of hous-
ing in our cities is largely accomplished through real estate brokers,
mortgage lenders, and builders. He then argues:
Zoning is a state and municipal function.... When the State
leaves that function to private agencies or institutions who are
licensees and who practice racial discrimination and zone our
cities into white and black belts or white and black ghettoes, it
suffers a governmental function to be performed under private
auspices in a way the State itself may not act.
He goes on to make it clear that there are only certain matters on
which state inaction will be deemed to be action, a limiting point
which was somewhat obscured in his Bell opinion because of his
privileges and immunities argument. He argues that the equal protec-
tion clause requires licensed and regulated business "affected with a
public interest" to provide service to all without discrimination; he
includes in the public interest area urban housing, restaurants, inns,
carriers, telephone companies, drug stores, and hospitals. Some un-
defined "domain exclusively private" would, it is said, present a dif-
ferent problem.
Justice Black's language in Bell could be used to sum up Justice
Harlan's dissenting opinion in Reitman, in which Justice Black joined.
Both opinions are based on a finding that the record did not show "the
slightest state coercion of, or encouragement to" the private discrimina-
tion. He disagreed with the majority view that the question of
whether California, by § 26, had encouraged or authorized the dis-
crimination was one of fact and argued rather that it was one of federal
constitutional law to be determined by the Supreme Court. He charac-
terized the amendment as "simply permissive of private decision-
making rather than coercive.""2 He distinguished the prior cases in
which the state was said to have induced or authorized the discrimina-
tion by stating that in those situations "the focus has been on positive
state cooperation or partnership in affirmatively promoted activities,
an involvement that could have been avoided."8" In the instant case
he found "only the straight forward adoption of a neutral position. ' '8 4
Based on his view that there was simple neutrality, he argued that
under the majority's theory
"state action" in the form of laws that do nothing more than
passively permit private discrimination could be said to tinge
30. Id. at 333.
31. 387 U.S. at 384.
32. Id. at 391.
33. Id. at 394.
34. Id.
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all private discrimination with the taint of unconstitutional state
encouragement.95
In view of the discussion of neutrality in the dissent, it seems
implicit in the opinion of Justice White in Reitman that a state is not
neutral when it recognizes that its citizens have the right to discrimi-
nate, and in addition, when the state seeks to protect that right by
constitutional guarantee. It also seems clear that when the state goes
beyond neutrality, so defined, there is present state action which is
prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. Neutrality, in the White
view, would seem to be no longer present when a state, to any extent,
recognizes, by official act, a right to practice discrimination."0 The
dissent on the other hand concludes that a state is neutral so long as
it takes no positive step which would make it an accomplice in the
discrimination, even though its actions facilitate discrimination. Justice
Douglas takes the view that any time the state is at all involved, any
resulting discrimination in areas which he deems affected with a public
interest is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.87
The Burton case, though it did not speak in neutrality terms, is
relevant to any discussion of neutrality because it appears that the state
there did not violate either of the definitions of neutrality discussed
above. There was no showing that the Authority approved, aided,
encouraged, or even considered the discriminatory practices of the
restaurant. In view of the fact that Burton appears to rest on a notion
of apparent authority from the state to the restaurant to discriminate
without a showing that the state acted at all, the Reitman-majority's
definition of neutrality is not at all difficult to reach from an examina-
tion of Burton and is in accord with the underlying theory of that case.
For those who would now oppose open housing legislation by
arguing that civil rights legislation cannot be repealed, Justice White
indicated that had Article 1, Section 26 been a mere repealer it would
not have been struck down. 8 It is only because the amendment went
so far as to attempt to guarantee a state constitutional right to dis-
criminate that the fourteenth amendment came into play.
This case does not, however, settle the problem with a clear defini-
tion of an easily applicable formula for determining what is state action.
The uncertainty in the area has been cleared very little by Reitman,
except to the extent that "neutrality" may have been defined by the
Court. Even though the question of whether a state is neutral may
35. Id. at 394-95.
36. Neither the California court nor Justice White argued that the prohibition
against future open housing regulation implicit in § 26 pushed or helped push California
beyond neutrality. It can be argued that a state is no longer neutral when it prevents,
permanently, legislative action in the field of open housing, because such prevention
establishes a "state policy which encourages present discrimination." The "state
policy" concept is a device, often used by the Court in encouragement cases, i.e.,
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964), which permits the Court to find
prohibited state action without the necessity of overruling its prior decisions holding
that the equal protection clause does not require a state to act affirmatively to halt
existing private discrimination.
37. See notes 28 and 29 supra and accompanying text.
38. 387 U.S. at 380-81.
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become an important one in future decisions, that determination appar-
ently will be made by a case-by-case examination of all the relevant
factors and circumstances. What does seem evident from the Reitman
decision, however, is that the Court's majority is edging closer to the
Douglas view in that the Court is now finding unconstitutional state
action in cases such as Burton and Reitman where the state's conduct
is indirect and non-essential to the resulting discrimination. It appears
that tin the future the Court will 'be applying the Douglas rationale in
state action cases as it pays lip service -to the case-by-case approach
announced in Burton and verbally followed in Reitman. The problem
of how far to extend Shelley remains, and since the Court in Reitman
said it was following Burton's principle of looking at all the surround-
ing circumstances, even though it seemingly looked no further than the
California court's logical conclusions, the problem is likely to go un-
resolved and the uncertainty is likely to remain for some time.
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